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ABSTRACT 
The effect of relative racial attitudes on estimates of 
the percentages of positive and negative traits within a Negro 
_and white stimulus population was tested. A factorial design 
was used with repeated measures on two of three factors. The 
/ 
factors were as follows: 1) attitude toward members of the 
stimulus population (pro-white, middle; pro-Negro); 2) traits 
attributed to members of the stimulus population (smart-dumb, 
clean-dirty, hardworking-lazy); 3) distribution of the traits 
within the stimulus population (racial equality, whites superior, 
Negroes superior). The subjectis ta~k was to estimate the 
percentage.of Negroes and whites with positive and negative 
traits in each of nine stimulus populations, The four estimates 
in each problem were ~ombined in three different ways giving 
dependent measures of 1) pro-white bias, 2) positive-trait 
bias, and 3) white-overpopulation bias. The prediction that 
subjects with a pro-Negro attitude would bias the estimates in 
favor of Negroes and that pro-white subjects would do just 
the opposite received only limited support. It was suggested 
_that this lack of relationship may have been due to an inadequate 
measure of attitude, A significant effect of attitude on 
estimation of positive-trait persons irrespective of race was 
found. There was a tendency across all subjects to bias the 
1 
estimates in favor of whites. This tendency seemed to be most 
pronounced in the Negro superior problems and in problems where 
the_ trait content was cle~n-dirty. There was also some support 
for inferring that whites were reluctant to view Negroes as 
lazy. These findings suggested that a subject would be more 
/ prone to infer a relationship between race and trait when the 
relationship is favorable to whites. A tendency to equalize 
distributions, however, seems to indicate that subjects would 
. 
be reluctant to infer any strong correlation between race and 
trait. 
' 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The term "prejudice" is frequently defined simply as a 
negative attitude towards an ethnic group. (In popular usage 
the group is most commonly assumed to be the Negr0 race.) 
Broadening the concept somewhat~ a number of writers have pro-
posed definitions based on the norm of rationality (Powdermaker, 
1944; Lippit and Radke, 1946; Allport, 1954; Kelman and 
Pettigrew, 1959; Simpson and Yinger, 1965). In summing up this 
view, Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, and Chein (1969, p. 5) state 
that "Prejudice in the sense of deviation from the norm of 
rationality may occur in the form of hasty judgment or prejudg-
ment, overgeneralization, thinking in stereotypes, refusal to 
modify an opinion in·the face of new evidence, and refusal to 
admit or take· account of individual differences." In the case 
of anti-Negro prejudice, Woodmansee and Cook (1967) found the 
holding of derogatory beliefs to be one of the six item clusters 
• 
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which most adequately differentiated members of pro-Negro and 
anti-Negro organizations. From this it can ~e inferred that 
basic to these processes of overgeneralization and stereotyping, 
is the tendency to attribute specific traits to all members of 
·a partic~lar ethnic group. Since the holding of derogatory 
beliefs can be understood to include th~ assignment of negative 
traits, anti-Negro prejudice caµ be at least partially described 
as the belief that there is a high correlation between a person's 
race (in this case Negro) and the presence of nega€ive traits. 
Conversely, a person who has a favorable attitude towards a 
group (called "love prejudice" as opposed to "hate prejudice" 
by Allport, 1954) could be expected to believe that membership 
in the ethnic group is highly correlated with possession of 
positive traits. 
The concept of correlation when drawn from one's own 
experience depends on the estimation of frequencies. Specifi-
cally in the case of stereotyping and overgeneralizing, it 
involves the categorization of events as conforming or not 
conforming to an hypothesis of equivalence: trait= race, i.e., 
trait and race are either both present or both absent. Smedslund 
· (1963) studied the concept of correlation in adults and found 
that persons with no statistical training had no adequate 
concept of correlation. Instead, he found a tendency to depend 
' 
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exclusively on the frequency of the++ cases (e,g., trait and 
race both present) in judging relationships. It is evident then 
that even in subjects with no concept of how to arrive at a 
·degree o~ correlation (of 19 subjects, ten had never heard of 
the concept and six had encountered the Nord but never had it 
explained) estimates of relatio~ship are based on frequency 
and/or proportion estimates. It can therefore be inferred that 
insofar as .the stereotypes and overgeneralizations 'characteristic 
of prejudice are based on explicit or implicit correlational 
beliefs, the ability to correctly estimate proportions (or 
percentages) of group members and non-members both possessing 
and not possessing the trait(s) in question is important in both 
prejudice development and change. 
- . 
The present study is concerned with the effect of already 
existing attitudes on deviations from the norm of rationality 
in the form of refusal to modify an opinion in the face of new 
evidence. Specifically it is concerned with the effects of both 
"hate prejudice" and "love prejudice" on estimates of the 
percentages of positive and negative traits within a Negro and 
white stimulus population. 
Although the effects of attitude on estimates of numbers 
(numerousness) ~as been a largely neglected problem, there is 
considerable evidence th~t values and attitudes play an important 
5 
part in both perception and memory; A tendency to produce more 
food responses and to recognize food related words quicker when 
hungry than when satiated (at least for moderate levels of 
hunger) was found by Levine, Chein~ and Murphy (1942), 
McClelland and Atkinson (1948), and Wis~e and Drambarean (1953) 
It has also been found that stimuli recently associated with 
rewards are more salient and more readily perceived than stimuli 
associated with failure (Proshansky and Murphy, 19(2; Schafer 
and Murphy, 1943; Sommer, 1957). Similarly, when stimuli are 
made noxious by prior association with electric shock, recog-
nition is impaired (Rosen, 1954i Dulany, 1957; McNamara, Solley 
and Long, +958; Lowenfeld, 1961; Hochberg and Brooks, 1958). 
Secord, Bevan and Katz (1956) found that high prejudiced sub-
jects showed a greater tendency than low prejudiced subjects to 
exaggerate differences between Negroes and whites in physical 
characteristics correlated with race. Taken together these 
studies seem to indicate that at least for those instances when 
accurate perception is not required for immediate action (a 
condition met by the above) persons tend to either distort or 
select their perceptions in the direction of "seeing what they 
want to see." 
With respect to the effect of attitude on memory, findings 
' 
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are similar. In general it can be said that unless a person is 
specifically motivated to do otherwise, there seems to be a 
general tendency to selectively remember ideas and statements 
·which ma~ntain his attitude unchanged, Recall, therefore, 
tends to be best for both support.ive ide,.as and for those non-
supportive ideas which are, at least from the person's point of 
view, easily refutable (Levine and Murphy, 1943; Jones and 
Aneshansel, 1956; Jones and Kohler, 1958; Feather, -1969a, 1969b, 
1969c). It should be noted here that some studies have not 
t 
found this effect of attitude (Waly and Cook, 1966; Greenwald 
and Sakumura, 1967). In studies varying pay-off value for re-
calling occurrence of letters of the alphabet, Taub (1965) and 
Christ (1967) found better recal~ for high value stimuli than for 
low value stimuli. Christ and Teichner (1967), however, re-
plic~ted the studies using more realistic elements and found 
no difference between the high and low value conditions. 
On the basis of these studies one would expect a person 
to more readily perceive and remember positive traits in a 
positively valued race (object of ''love prejudice") while per-
ceiving negative trai'ts more readily in a negatively valued race 
(object of "hate prejudice"). On the basis of Secord, Bevan and 
Katz' work and other studies showing an accentuation of 
7 
difference between stimuli falling into different classes 
(Tajfel, 1959) one could further expect that when members of 
these two races are seen together perception and recall of 
differences between them on negative and positive traits will 
be distorted and accentuated with the low value group perceived 
I 
as more toward the negative extreme and the high value group 
as more toward the positive extreme. 
It should be noted that although accurate estimations of 
percentages of elements falling into various trait-race cate-
gories depends on accurate perception (and memory 1 when estimation 
occurs after the elements are removed), it also requires the 
subject to go a step further and judge how many elements in one 
category were perceived relative to the number perceived in 
. 
other categories. There is considerable evidence that number 
estimations are strongly influenced both by the absolute magni-
tude and by the relative magnitude of the number. With the 
exception of Mann and Taylor (1969) who found an effect of 
position on estimation of the number of persons ahead, guidelines 
for predicting direction of distortion must be found in the 
psychophysical literature. 
A general tendency to overestimate low values and un~er-
estimate high values has been reported by Erlick (1964), Howel 
and Funaro (1965} I Preston and Baratta 
t 
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(1948)' and Jamison and 
Kozielecki (1968). A related tendency to overestimate the number 
of small objects and underestimate the number of large objects 
was found by Miller and Baker (1968). Bevan and Turner (1964) 
found that when identified as part of the figure a large frame 
resulted in underestimation, Insofar as the relative area of 
I 
dots is small within the large frame, this fits in with the 
other studies. Similar results were also obtained by Bevan, 
Maier, and Helson (1963). Smedslund (1963), howev~r, using 
meaningful stimuli found no unambiguous relationship between 
tendencies to over- and und~restimate and relativfu frequency 
of event category. 
The finding of Smedslund ties in with the previous findings 
of Christ and Teichner and suggests that when the subject's 
task is to remember whether an event occurred or not (and in 
Smedslund's task to also count the frequency of occurrence) 
the effects of both value and relative magnitude of the elements 
is less (or non-existent) for meaningful elements than for 
non-meaningful elements (dots, etc.). A further prediction 
therefore is that although effects of true magnitudes on 
percentage estimates of positive and negative traits as attri-
buted to members of a biracial population may occur, they will 
not be of sufficient strength to mask the effects of attitudes 
toward the two races. , 
9 
In previous research on effects of ethnic attitudes on 
perception and recall, the independent measure has typically 
been the subject's score on a test of prejudice towards the 
.ethniq g~oup of which the subject is not a .member. This is 
entirely valid in research aimed at establishing differential 
/ 
re~ponses toward members of or stimuli related to the other 
ethnic group. However, when the aim of the research includes 
an attempt to assess responses to members of a subject's own 
group versus responses to members of another group it would 
seem that the subject's attitude toward his own race is relevant. 
A clear-cut and steady increase- in p'ref erence for white friends 
over Negro friends among whites has been reported among young 
children (Landreth and Johnson, 1953; Stevenson and Stewart, 
1958; Morland, 1962) through high school students (Horowitz, 
However, these studies were done before the current 
black power and black separatist movements began and also some-
what before the upsurge in awareness among white college 
students of the racism embedded in much of "white" America. 
Consequently it was thought that the assumption that all whites 
have a positive attitude towards their own race is a tenuous 
assumption at best. There also seems to be no ~ priorj._ reason 
for believing that a person's attitude toward one race is 
negatively correlated w~th his attitude toward another race. 
For these reasons, it was decided to compute a measure of 
10 
relative racial attitude by subtracting the subject's attitude 
toward Negroes from his attitude toward whites. 
CHAPTER II: ME'l'HOD 
Ove~view.--A factorial design was used with repeated 
measures on two of three factors. The ~actors were as follows: 
1) attitude toward members .of ~he stimulus population (pro-
white, middle, pro-Negro); 2) traits attributed to members 
of the stimulus population (smart-dumb, clean-dirty, hardworking-
lazy); 3) distribution of the traits within the stimulus 
population (whites equal to Negroes in percentage of positive 
and negative traits, whites higher than Negroes in percentage 
of positive traits but lower in percentage of negative traits, 
N~groes higher than whites in peDcentage of positive traits but 
lower in percentage of negative traits). The subject's task 
was to estimate the percentage of Negroes and whites with 
positive and negative traits in each of nine stimulus populations 
The four estimates in each problem were combined in three 
different ways giving dependent measures of 1) pro-white bias, 
2) white over-population bias, and 3) positive trait bias. 
Following the task, attitudes toward whites and Negroes were 
measured with the semantic differential. 
11 
·•v·ra •• •, 
Subjects.--The subjects were 125 white Loyola undergraduates 
fulfilling part of the requirements of a course in introductory 
psycholo~y. The number of males and females was approximately 
equal. Black students who signed up for the experiment were 
/ 
run although their scores were not included in the analyses. 
subjects were run in groups of ten with assignment to groups 
determined by order of sign-up for the experiment. Three 
subjects were dropped due to failure to complete one or more 
of the problems. 
Experimenters.--There were "thre~ experimenters, two females 
and one male. The two female experimenters were white graduate 
students and the male was an undergraduate senior. Each ran 
approximately one third of the subjects. 
Task Materials.--Task materials consisted of nine decks 
of 40 lOmre. by 15mm. index cards each. On all cards either 
the word NEGRO or the word WHITE was typed on the upper half. 
Within each deck there were 20 NEGRO cards and 20 WHITE cards. 
Typed on the lower half of each card was either the word SMART 
or DUMB (three decks), the word CLEAN or DIRTY (three decks), 
or the word LAZY or HARDWORKING (three decks). Type was .Smm. 
Roman letters. Within each deck there were 20 positive trait 
l~ 
cards (SMART, CLEAN, HARDWORKING) and 20 negative trait cards 
(CUMB, DIRTY, LAZY). Cards within each deck were randomized 
separately. All subjects got the same random orders. 
Each dee~ of cards fell into one of th~ following con-
ditions depending on the distribution of positive and negative 
/' 
traits between the two races; 1) whites equal to Negroes in 
number of positive and negative traits (three decks), 2) whites 
higher than Negroes in percentage of positive traits but lower 
in number of negative traits (three decks), 3) Negroes higher 
than whites in number of positive traits but lowe~ in percentage 
of negative traits (three decksf. These conditions are referred 
to as racial equality, white superior, and Negro superior 
respectively in the remainder of the papers. (See Table 1 for 
distributions.) 
Table 1 
Percentage Distributions Within Decks 
Race 
.White 
Negro 
Racial Equality 
Decks 
Traits 
White Superior 
Decks 
Traits 
Negro Superior 
Decks 
Traits 
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative 
25% 25%' 37.5% 12.5% 12.5% 37.5% 
25% 25% 12.5% 37.5% 37.5% 12.5% 
t 
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..... --------------~------------....._ ____ ._. __ __...,..._,,,... __ ,_,....,.., ................. _. ____________________ ...,. 
At the end of each deck was a card with four questions 
asking the subject to estimate the percentages of white negative 
cards, white positive cards, Negro positive cards and Negro 
negative cards. The four questions were in a different random 
/ 
order for each problem but were the same over subjects. At 
the beginning of each deck was a card giving instructions for 
the problem. Subjects were instructed to look at each card in 
•the deck once and then put it on the bottom of the deck. Cover 
stories saying that the cards represented persons' in a real 
population and explaining how the 11 d·a ta" was collected were 
also included on each instruction card. ThreB different cover 
stories were used, one for each of the trait areas. 
To eliminate as far as possible subject-experimenter inter-
action during the experiment and to enable individual subjects 
to work at their own pace, all nine decks were given to the 
subject at the beginning of the experiment. A problem box 
was constructed by inserting index markers at one inch intervals 
in a 16.Smm. by 35mm. cardboard box, The markers were labeled 
from one to nine consecutively and the appropriate problem deck 
was inserted in front of each marker, Order of the problems 
was random and was the same for all subjects. (See Appendix A 
14 
for the exact order.) 
On the front of the problem box a pocket was made with 
construction paper and a general instruction card was inserted, 
An overall cover story stating that the task was a test to see 
how well people estimate percentages on the basis of first 
/ 
impressions was included on the card as well as task instructions 
In~tructions and card decks were ordered so that at_the beginning 
of each deck subjects were told what to do with that particular 
deck and at the end of each deck they were told to replace the 
deck and pick up the next. (See Appendix B for exact wording 
of the instruction cards and the percentage estimation cards.) 
Attitude Measure.--Subjects rated a number of American 
ethnic groups using. the standard instructions and format of the 
semantic differential. Among the groups rated were the Negro 
American and the White American. They rated these groups on 
ten seven-step bipolar adjective scales. The measure of 
attitudes was based on responses to the following five scales: 
good-bad, va~uable-worthless, fair-unfair, pleasant-unpleasant, 
clean-dirty. These scales have been shown to be high on the 
evaluative dimension and to correlate highly with Thurstone's 
measure of anti-Negro prejudice (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 
1957). Responses on each scale were scored from one to seven 
in the direction of positive evaluation and summed to give a 
range of possible scores from 5 t9 35. In order to obtain a 
15 
measure of preference for one race relative to the other the 
Negro American score was subtracted from the White American 
score giving a range of possible scores from -35 to +35. (This 
score was utilized in all further analyses.) Thus, a positive 
score indicates a preference for whites over Negroes, a negative 
/ 
score indicates a preference for Negroes over whites, and a 
score of zero indicates no preference for one over the other. 
The remaining.five bipolar adjective scales were included as 
filler items. The order of the group concepts was the same for 
all subjects except that for half the subjects th~ American 
Negro concept preceded the American White concept and for the 
other half the order was reversed. Bipolar adjective scales 
for the first race concept (American Negro for half and American 
White for the other half) were in identical random order. A 
different random order was used for the second race concept. 
Orders were randomized for each of the other concepts separately 
and were constant across subjects. 
The semantic differential instructions and scales were 
typed on lOmm. by 15mm. index cards and were inserted in the 
problem box immediate~y following the last percentage estimation 
problem. The index marker was labeled "Group Impression'' and 
a cover story included on the instruction card indicated that it 
was a test to measure first impressions of groups. 
' 
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(See 
Appendix B for the exact wording.) 
Procedure.--All subjects upon entering the experimental 
room were seated at a large table • In front of each subject was 
. a proble~ box. The experimenter told the subjects that the 
experiment was an attempt to measure how people make first 
/ 
impressions. A few comments were made about the importance of 
first impressions in everyday life. In order to discourage 
subjects from trying to memorize and count the car~s, comments 
were made regarding the quickness of most first impression 
formation. Subjects were told that all necessary' instructions 
for the first impression tasks were contained in the problem 
box and were instructed to raise their hand for help if at any 
time during the experiment they did not understand what they 
were to do. Subjects were told to begin by picking up the first 
ihstruction card. Subjects went through the nine problem decks 
and one semantic differential deck at their own rate and left 
when they were finished. 
Dehoaxing was not done as it was felt by the experimenter 
that informing the subjects that the true nature of the experi-
ment was to assess their attitudes and the effect of their 
attitudes on their estimates might tend to cause many of them 
to worry about what kinds of estimates they put down. The 
probability that some would come to negative self-evaluations 
seems to justify the continued deception. 
17 
CHAPTER III: RESULTS 
Data was available from 128 subjects. The total distri-
bution of attitude scores was divided into three groups with 
approxima~ely one fifth of the subjects in each of the two 
extreme groups and the remaining three fifths in the middle. 
/ 
The range of scores was from -12 to +26 with a negative scorf 
signifying a greater preference for Negroes than for wh~tes and 
a positive score signifying a greater preference for whites 
than for Negroes, Cutting points for attitude classification 
were as follows; Pro-Negro,. below O; Middle, 0 to 7; Pro-
white, above 7. Three subjects-did not complete one or more of 
the problems and were deleted leaving ~'s of 27, 73 and 25 for 
the pro-Negro attitude,. middle attitude, and pro-white attitude 
groups respectively, Of the remaining 125 subjects 26 made 
errors such that the sum of the percentages for a problem did 
not equal 100%, Since the subjects making errors were not 
evenly distributed over the three attitude levels (14.8%, 19.2%, 
and 32.0% of the pro-Negro attitude, middle attitude, and 
pro-white attitude groups respectively made errors) the estimates 
were corrected by adding one fourth of the amount needed to 
each estimate in the problem. Thus the relations among the 
estimates were not distrubed and these subjects were included 
in the sample. 
' 
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Analysis of Four Percentage Estimates 
In order to standardize scores across problem types having 
different frequency distributions, estimate error scores were 
computed ?Y subtracting the true percentage from the estimated 
percentage for each of the four percentage estimations per 
I 
problem. Thus a positive score si~nifies a percentage over-
estimation and a negative score signifies a percentage under-
estimation. These error scores were used in the ne_xt step of 
analysis. 
Since within each problem the estimates for lhe white 
positiye, white negative, Negro"posi~ive, and Negro negative 
categories had to sum to 100%, estimates were not independent 
of each other. This is intuitively obvious when one considers 
that if a subject made an error on one estimate he had to com-
pensate for this by making an error in the opposite direction 
on one.or more of the remaining three estimates. Thus, estimate 
error scores for each problem over all subjects by necessity 
had to sum to zero. 
A derived set of variables that are uncorrela~ed, however, 
can be obtained by means of factor analysis. The method of 
principal components (~arman, 1959) was used in order to obtain 
computable as opposed to estimated component scores. In this 
sense, the four estimate~error variables white positive, white 
19 
negative, Negro positive, Negro negative can be seen as 
1 
occupying a space with the number of dimensions determined by 
the rank of the covariance matrix for the original estimate 
errors. ~hus, the initial set of observations can be completely 
represented by a set of component scores which are uncorrelated 
I 
and uniquely defined. This latter property is due to the fact 
that a principal component analysis yields a first component of 
maximum variance, a second with the next largest va!iance, but 
orthogonal to the first, etc, From another point of view, the 
first component reflects the over- and underestim&tion tendencies 
which account for the largest amount.of variance. Table 2 gives 
the correlation matrix (Rx), eigenvalues, and eigenvectors for 
the four estimate-error variables. 
Table 2 
1. Correlation Matrix for Mean Scores 
On Four Percentage Estimates* 
White White Negro Negro 
Estimates Positive Negative Positive Negative 
White 
Positive 1.00000 -.78366 -.28910 -.07373 
White 
Negative 1.00000 .01594 -.17165 
Negro 
Positive 1.00000 -.66996 
Negro 
Negative 1.00000 
*Means based on sum of nine problems per subject. 
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_2. Eigenvalues 
1,94531 1.52884 .52585 .00000 
,__. 
-----
3. Eigenvectors 
I II III IV 
White 
Positive .56891 -.43002 .40830 -.56983 
White /· 
Negative -.55089 .42731 .49812 -.51556 
Negro 
Positive -.46723 -.52421 -.54328 -.46015 
Negro 
.59807 -.53853 Negative .39314 -.44469 
Vector Labels: I= pro-white bias, II= positive-trait bias, 
III= white-overpopulation bias 
From this it can be seen that correlations between white positive 
and white negative estimate errors and between Negro positive 
and Negro negative estimate . errors are both high, negative and 
almost equal. Correlations between white positive and Negro 
positive estimate errors and between white negative and Negro 
negative estimate errors are low, negative and almost equal. 
Correlations between white positive and Negro negative and 
between white negative and Negro positive estimate errors are 
both near zero. Looking at the covariance matrix (Table 3, 
part 1) the pattern of similarities noted above for the 
correlation matrix is the same and-approximates quite closely 
the patterned covariance matrix in Table 3, part 2. 
~ 
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Estimates 
White 
Positive 
White 
Negative 
Negro 
Positive 
Negro 
Negative 
·Table 3 
1. Covariance Matrix for Mean Scores on 
Four Percentage Estimates 
2. 
White 
Positive 
11.48709 
White 
Negative 
-8.14419 
9.40222 
Negro 
Po.si tive 
/ -2. 68236 
.13376 
7.49442 
Equipredictability Covariance Pattern 
02 al2 oi3 Qi4 
62 ~ oG 
6'2 &> 
62 
-3 • Principal Component Structure 
Negro 
Negative 
- . 66097 
-1.39226 
-4.94439 
6.99709 
Variance Component Direction Cosines 
~ ~+~ 1 -1 -1 1 + + 
+ Of2 013 £514 1 -1 1 -1 p . 5 
012 + 013 ar4 1 1 -1 -1 
- .Vi2 -~+614 1 1 1 1 ~ 
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Such matrices (called equipredictability covariance patterns 
have the property that the four multiple correlation coefficients 
of one variable with the remaining three are equal (Bargman, 
1957). A matrix of this form, under pre- and post-multipli-
·cation by· the orthogonal matrix P (Table 3, part 3), will reduce 
to its diagonal form. Note that P givew the four orthogonal 
contrasts in the 2 x 2 factoria~. experimental design. Bock 
(1960) has shown that if the hypothesis that the off-diagonal 
elements of the transformed sample matrix are zero ~n the 
population is confirmed, then the covariation of any pair of 
scores can be explained in terms of the shared common components 
associated with ways of classifying the tests. These components 
can be named and interpreted in terms of the contrasts in the 
factori~l design. A likelihood rptio test given by Wilk's 
Criterion and Bartlett's approximation for moderate to large 
samples (as outlined by Bock) were performed to test whether 
the off-diagonal elements of the transformed sample matrix L; y 
given in Table 4 differ from zero. Since the scores were con-
strained to sum to zero in the sample, p 4 was deleted from the 
orthogonal matrix P. The test (called a structural analysis) 
did not reach significance and the assumption that the com-
position of the scores specified by the equipredictability 
covariance matrix is correct was not rejected. 
t 
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Table 4 
Covariance and Correlation Matrices for Mean Scores on 
Three Contrast Variables (Transformed Matrices) 
Contrasts 
pro-white 
bias 
positive-
trait bias 
white-over 
population 
bias 
Contrasts 
pro-white 
bias 
positive-
trait bias 
white-over 
population 
bias 
1. Covariances <2y> 
pro-white 
bias 
17.16420 
2. 
pro-white 
bias 
1.000 
positive-
trai t bias' 
3.16645 
.13.61580 
Correlations (Ry) 
positive-
tra·i t bias 
.. 194 
1.000 
white-over 
population bias 
1.29060 
4.60182 
white-over 
population bias 
.145 
.100 
1.000 
Due to the close approximation of the obtained covariance 
matrix to the equipredictability covariance pattern, contrast 
scores were computed using weights of ,5, 
' 
Three contrast 
scores were computed for each problem corresponding to the 
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.-----------------------------------------------........ --------...,,----------·----------------~ 
vectors p 2 , p 3 , and p 4 of P, The first component, labeled pro-
white bias, accounts for approximately 49% of the variance, 
the second component, labeled positive-trait bias, accounts for 
approximat~ly 38% of the variance and the third component, 
labeled white over-population bias iccounts for the remaining 
/ 
13% of the variance, Because the covariance matrix for the 
four percentage estimates is of rank 3, all of the original 
variance is accounted for by the three· derived mutually 
orthogonal contrast variables, i,e,, tr ( 2::y> = tr <Z x> 
(~is presented in Table 4 1 part l.>' Since the pontrast 
scores thus derived can, on the basis of the non-rejection of 
the assumption that ;;i}y is diagonal and under the assumption 
that the contrast variables follow a multivariate normal dis-
tribution, be regarded as statistically independent of each 
other, a separate analysis of variance for three factors with 
repeated measures on the last two factors (Winer, p. 319) was 
carried out for each variable. For each analysis, a matrix of 
covariances of the repeated measures within each of the popu-
lations was computed. Inspection of these matrices indicated 
that ,the assumptions underlying the repeated measures analysis 
of variance (as outlined by Winer, p. 371) appeared to be 
satisfied for all three variables. 
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Analysis £1_ Variance for Pro ... w__~~t~ Bia~ fontrast 
Table 5 presents the mean scores for pro-white bias in 
relation to relative attitudes toward Negroes and whites. 
Table 5 / 
Mean Scores for Problems (3) in Relation to 
Trait Contents (3) on pro-white Bi~s, Positive-trait Bias 
and White-overpopulation Bias 
Problem 
Distribution 
Racial 
Equality 
White 
Superior 
Negro 
Superior 
Trait 
Content 
Smart-Dumb 
Clean-Dirty 
Hardworking-
Lazy 
Smart-Dumb 
Clean-Dirty 
Hardworking-
Lazy 
Smart-Dumb 
Clean-Dirty 
Hardworking-
Lazy 
Pro-White 
Bias 
Contrast· 
.300 
5.132 
-2.364 
.,..1. 712 
... 5,224 
.916 
9,352 
4,320 
.508 
-~~~p. 
Positive 
Trait Bias 
Contrast, 
1.996 
1.640 
2.060 
,816 
2.864 
6.412 
3.996 
2,556 
2.268 
White-over 
population 
Bias 
Contrast 
.240 
.700 
.312 
,020 
2,908 
3.128 
-1.028 
,484 
,376 
Since each score as noted above was computed according to the 
following linear combination, pro-white bias .5(white positive 
estimate error + Negro negative estimate error) .5(white 
negative estimate error+ Negro positive estimate error), a 
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pQsitiye score reflects an overestimation of positive-trait 
whites and negative-trait Negroes (taken as a group) and an 
underestimation of negative~trait whites and positive-trait 
~egroes taken as a group. This analysis therefore serves as a 
test of the main prediction that subjects with a pro-white 
/' 
attitude would be biased in favor of whites whereas subjects 
with a pro~Negro attitude would be biased in favor of Negroes, 
Table 6 summarizes the analysis of variance of the data, 
Table 6 
I 
. Analysis of Variance for Pro-White Bias 
'· . '''d:i: . ;· .. MS 
''- "''"""' ' 
F 
~ ~~-~~ ..,-.. --~-,,........~--,--.,.-~~--.-.,,..,...,,~~ --:---~~~----r-----..,-.,,.c-.-~ 
Between Ss 
At ti tu de (A J 
Error 1 
Within Ss 
Problem Distribution (Pl 
P x A 
Error 2 
Trait content (C) 
C .X A 
Error 3 
p x c 
P x C x A 
Error 4 
* p ~ .10 
** p .c:. • 001 
' 
2 
122~ 
2 
4 
244• 
2 
4 
244· 
4 
8 
488 
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426.736 
149.906 
5,056.472 
395.034 
198.987 
1,232.819 
177.052 
108.708 
1,844.325 
142.289 
89.573 
2.847* 
25.411** 
1.985 
11.341** 
1.629 
20.590** 
1.589 
Main effects due to attitude (A) were significant at the .10 
level. Though the level of significance is not high, inspection 
of the means (Table 7) indicated that differences between pro-
white attitude and pro-Negro attitude are in the predicted 
direction, and offer limited support for the hypothesis. 
I 
Tab;J_e 7 
Means for Main Effects of Attitude (A), Problem 
Distribution {P), and Trait Content (C) 
Attitude (A) 
Pro-White 
Middle 
Pro-Negro 
Problem Tiistribution (P) 
.Racial Equality 
White Superior 
Negro Superior 
Trait Content (C) 
Smart-Dumb 
Clean-Dirty 
Hardworking-Lazy 
Pro-White 
Bias 
2.570 
.561 
.743 
1.0227 
-2.6173 
4.7267 
2.6467 
1.4093 
- . 9240 
Positive-
Trait Bias 
1.349 
2.741 
3.895 
1.8653 
3.3640 
2.9067 
2.2693 
2.2867 
3.580 
White Over 
Population Bias 
2.793 
1.523 
1.451 
.0493 
2.0187 
- . 3067 
- .4160 
1.3640 
.8133 
Main effects of both problem distribution (P) and trait 
content (C) were statistically significant. Because of its 
applicability to.groups of unequal sizes and its relative insen-
' 
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sitivity to departures from normality, Scheffe's method for 
paired comparisons (outlined in Hays, 1963) was used to test 
differences between specific means. Scores tended to be higher 
for Negro.superior problems than for white superior problems 
(p.('.05) with neither condition differing from the racial 
I 
equality problem. However, since the difference between the 
Negro superior and the white superior conditions can be at least 
partially attributed to an effort by the subjects to equalize 
the percentages, a t-test for correlated means was done to 
test whether the tendency to overestimate on the Negro superior 
problems was greater than the tendency to underestimate on 
the white superior problems. Results were significant at the 
p-=:::::.025 level (df. l24, t = 1.98 for a one-tailed test). 
Subjects as a whole also tended to have higher pro-white 
bias scores when the traits smart-dumb were attributed to 
the population than when the traits hardworking-lazy were used 
·(p.:::::".05). Neither of these bipolar trait conditions differed 
from the clean-dirty condition. 
The significant P x C interaction in Table 6 was primarily 
due to differences on. the clean-dirty and smart-dumb conditions. 
The interaction effects are graphed in Figure 1. For the 
Negro superior condition the order of means was the same as 
the main effect means with pro-white bias for the smart-dumb 
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condition significantly higher than for any other problem 
Cp<.os1. In the racial equality condition, however, pro-white 
bias tended to be higher for the clean-dirty condition than 
for either' of the other two which were equal (p <. 0 5) . The 
effect of the clean-dirty condition for 7he white superior 
probl-em was just the opposite, 
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Figure 1. Mean scores on pro-white bias for racial 
equality,-white superior, and Negro superior problem conditions 
in relation to t+ait content. 
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Analysis of Variance for Positive-Trait Bias Contrast 
Mean scores for positive-trait bias in relation to 
relative attitudes toward Negroes and whites are presented in 
.Table 5. Scores, as noted above, were computed according to 
the following linear combination: posi~ive-trait bias = .5 
(white positive estimate error + Negro positive estimate 
error) .5(white negative estimate erior + Negro negative 
estimate ei;ror). Thus a positive score reflects an overestima-
tion of persons with positive traits regardless.of race and a 
t 
negative score reflects an overestimation of persons with 
negative traits. Table 8 presents an analysis of variance of 
the data. 
Table 8 
Analysis of Variance for Positive-Trait Bias 
Source df MS F 
-
Between Ss 
Attitude (A) 2 379.370 3.182* 
Error l 122 119.222 
Within Ss 
Problem Distribution ( p) 2 221.221 2.775 
p x A 4 11.855 LI 
Error 2 ·244 79.714 
Trait Content (C) 2 .211,929 2.926 
A x c 4 41.353 .::::::::: l 
Error 3 244 72.412 
• 4 456.256 r 6.265** p x c 
A x p x c 8 74'.368 1.021 
Error 4 488 72.827 
·- ---------··--
* pc. 05 * * p <. 01 31 
Main effects due to attitude (A) were significant at the 
.OS level. However, differences between specific pairs of means 
were not significant. This lack of significant differences is 
most probably a result of the large difference between the ~ 
for the middle attitude level and both oj the other levels. 
Inspection of the direction of means (Table 7) reveals that 
mean overestimates of positive traits tends to be higher for 
the pro-Negro attitude condition than for the pro-white condition 
with the middle attitude group falling in between, 
t 
The significant P x C interaction in Table 8 was primarily 
due to differences between trait-content conditions within the 
white supexior problem condition, The interaction effects are 
graphed in Figure 2, Although th~re were no differences 
among means within both the racial equality and the Negro 
superior problems, order of means for the three trait-content 
conditions within the white superior proble.m condition were as 
follows: hardworking-lazy, clean-dirty, smart-dumb. Differences 
between .the white superior, hardworking-lazy condition and the 
remaining means (excluding the Negro super~or, smart-dumb 
·condition) were significant at the .05 level. 
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Figure 2. Mean scores on positive-trait bias for racial 
equality, white superior, and N~gro superior problem conditions 
in relation to trait content. 
~nalysj_~ 9.%_ variance for White-Ov~rp~pulation Bias Contrast 
Mean scores for white-overpopulation bias are presented 
in Table 5. Scores were computed according to the following 
linea~ combination: white-overpopulation bias = .5(white 
positive estimate error + white negative estimate error) .5 
(Negro positive estimate. error + Negro negative estimate error). 
Thus, a positive score indicates an overestimation of the 
number of whites in the population and a negative score indi-
cates an overestimation of the number of Negroes. Table 9 
presents an analysis of ~ariance of the data. 
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Table 9 
Analysis of Variance for White-Overpopulation Bias 
Source 
Between Ss 
Attitude (A) 
Error 1 
Within Ss 
Problem Distribution 
A x p 
Error 2 
Trait Content (C) 
A x c 
Error 
p x c 
A x p x 
Error 
* p .c::'.. 0 5 
** p <. 01 
3 
c 
4 
-
df MS F 
.~-
' 
-
2 )-6.692 <l 
122 42.172 
(P) 2 588.262 14.741** 
4 40.265 1.009 
244 39.907 
2 311.431 8.327** 
4 8.963 <l 
244 37.402 ~ 
- 4 88.164 2.455* 
8 26.681 <1 
488 35.914 
Both main effects of problem distribution (P) and of 
trait content (C) were significant at the .01 level. Tests 
between means summing over trait content indicates that over all 
subjects, overestimation of the number of whites was greater 
for the white superior condition than for either racial equality 
. (p.C:::::: .05) or Negro superior (p<.Ol) conditions. The latter 
two were not statistically different .. Summing over problem 
distribution, the clean-dirty condition was higher than the 
' 
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smart-dumb condition (p-<._.10) and neither was different from 
the hardworking-lazy condition. 
The significant P x C interaction (Table 9) was due 
primarily to the higher estimation for the white superior, 
hardworking-lazy condition as compared to the seven lowest 
means (p<.Ol) and the white superior, /· . . clean-dirty condition 
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Figure 3. Mean scores on White-Overpopulation Bias for 
Racial Equality, White Superior, and Negro Superior Problem 
Conditions in Relation to Trait Content. 
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CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION 
Effects o{ Attitude 
The major hypothesis that subjects with a pro-white 
attitude would tend to overestimate the white positive and 
/ 
Negro negative categories and underestimate the white negative 
and Negro positive categories (as evidenced by a high pro-
white bias score) while subjects with a pro-Negro attitude 
would do just the opposite received only limited support. The 
effects of attitude on the pro-white bias contras~ did not reach 
significance although the means ~ere.in the predicted direction. 
Although the number of possible reasons for not confirming a 
hypothesis are usually limited only by the ingenuity of the 
experimenter, a few of the more llkely reasons are as f~llows: 
1. One can assume that if subjects were asked to make 
the experimental estimates about the population in general 
(i,e., without evidence about specific populations) their 
estimates would be a function of their beliefs about or 
attitudes toward the respective races. In order to correctly 
estimate the categories within the experimental populations 
then a subject would have to modify his opinion on counter-
attitudinal problems by accepting new evidence, Since a com-
ponent of prejudice when defined as a deviation from the norm 
' 
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of rationality is the failure to modify opinions in the face of 
new evidence, the counter-attitudinal problems can be viewed as 
a m~asure of prejudice in the sense of a failure of rationality. 
The fndependent measures of attitude however were based 
on the semantic differential which is a measure of the evalua-
/ 
tive component of an attitude. In a sense then, prejudice is 
being defined as a relative dislike for one racial group over 
anotherL Harding et al. (1969, p. 5) call this a definition 
of prejudice in terms of a deviation from the norm of human-
heartedness. Although almost all measures of pre~udice have 
been found to correlate highly with each other, Schuman and 
Harding (1964) found that the only measures of prejudice in 
the sense of failure of rationality that correlated highly with 
other measures of prejudice and other types of ethnic attitude 
are measures of irrational b~as against members of a particular 
group. Irrational bias in favor of a group can be assessed only 
by measures specifically designed for this purpose. Since the 
pro-white bias contrast is a function of both bias in favor 
of and bias against the respective races, it is possible that 
the lack of a relationship is a function of an inadequate 
attitude measure. 
2. In line with the correlation between evaluative 
measures and measures of~irrational bias against members of a 
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particular group, it is probable that attitude influenced the 
estimation of the unfavorable trait category. If all subjects 
tended to overestimate the white-positive category (as seems 
.probable when measures on both pro-white bias and positive-
trait bias are examined jointly), then the attitude effect on 
/ 
estimates of the Negro negative category might be masked or 
inhibited. 
3. Both Schuman and Harding's and the present results 
however lead to another option. It is altogether possible 
that with realistic stimuli, attitude does not have the strong 
effect on perception and immedi~te r~call that has been 
attributed to it in the past. Most studies showing such an 
effect on immediate recall were done before 1960 and used 
pro- and anti-attitudinal statements. Studies conducted after 
i960 (Waly and Cook, 1966; Greenwald and Sakumura, 1967) 
have not found an effect of attitude. The effect of 
differential prior knowledge of the ideas contained in the 
statements does not seem to have been controlled in any of 
these studies. If one can assume that, due to the mass media's 
esten~ive coverage of. the civil rights movement in the U. s. 
since 1960, college subjects are more likely now than before 
1960 to be fairly well aquainted with the arguments of the 
"other side," these findJngs are consistent. The effects of 
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value on perception of stimuli (and in some cases on counting 
the number of occurances of a valued event) seems to be most 
apparent only when the stimuli are unrealistic. As noted 
above, Christ and Teichner (1967) did not find an effect with 
realistic stimuli. ' 
The in(erence that there i$ no effect whatsoever of 
realistic stimuli value however does not seem to be warranted. 
If this were true, then the effects of problem distribution 
and trait content discussed in the next section·would not 
have been found. 
4. Subjects who estimated perdentages in a biased manner 
may have been aware of this and attempted to counteract it by 
marking .. the attitude scales in the opposite direction. If 
those subjects whose percentage estimations were extreme did 
this then they would be moving toward the middle attitude group, 
leaving as members of the extreme groups subjects who did not 
bias their percentage estimates. 
The significant effect of attitude on positive-trait bias 
indicates a tendency for estimates of positive traits regardless 
of race to increase as preference for Negroes increases. This 
finding is not unusual in light of other findings that pre-
judice is positLvely correlated with displacement of hostility 
' under frustration (Berkowitz, 1961, 1962;, Weatherly, 1961), 
alienation and "anomie" (McDill, 1961; Roberts and Rokeach, 
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1956) and authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, 
and Sanford, 1950). There was no effect of attitude on white-
overpopulation bias. Since the only way to get it would be to 
make relatively high estimates for both the white positive 
and white negative categories, / such an effect would not be 
expected. 
5. It may be that simple dichetemous judgments (smart-
dumb, etc.) strikes the subjects as stereotypes and simplistic. 
Karlins, Coffman, and Walters (1969) £ound that many subjects 
I 
in a college population are reluctant to make generalizations 
about other groups. If a majority of the subjects were re-
luctant to differen~iate the races on the traits, differences 
betwee~the attitude groups woul~ be minor. Bettleheim and 
Janowitz's (1964) findings of no significant relationship 
between personal stereotypes and personal attitudes suggests 
that even if the subjects did not resist stereotyping there 
may simply be no clear-cut relationship between stereotyping 
tendencies and ethnic attitudes. 
Other Effects 
The effect of problem distribution on pro-white bias was 
significant and ·indicated a tendency for all subjects to score 
' higher on Negro superior problems than on white superior 
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problems. Due to the relative distribution of the true per~ 
centages in these problems, a negative score for white 
superior problems can be explained in line with other findings 
'on estimation of relative quantities as simply an attempt to 
equalize the categories (i.e., underestiwation of both high 
categories apd overestimation of both low categories). A 
positive score for the Negro superior problem distribution may 
be due to the same tendency to equalize categories.- The 
tendency to equalize percentages was greater for the Negro 
t 
superior distribution than for the white superior distribution 
and therefore at least some bias across all subjects is indicated 
This is further supported by findings on the white-overpopulation 
bias contrast variable. The mean. score for the white superior 
problems was higher than for both the racial equality and the 
Negro superior problems suggesting that subjects were more 
reluctant to underestimate the white positive category than 
the Negro negative category~ 
An effect of trait content on pro-white bias scores was 
significant at the .001 level. The mean score was higher for 
the bipolar traits smart-dumb than for hardworking-lazy and 
neither differed from clean-dirty. When problem distribution 
is taken into account the results are somewhat different. Al-
' 
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though the means on the Negro superior problems were in accord 
with the direction of the trait main effects, on the racial 
equality problems clean-dirty was higher than either of the 
other two trait areas. An opposite effect was found on the 
white superior problems (i.e., clean-dirty was lower than 
/ 
either of the other trait areas). 
The si~plest explanation of these results is in terms 
of the order of problems in the problem box (which was constant 
for all subjects). Note that the Negro superior, smart-dumb 
problem was both the ~irst problem worked by the ~ubject and 
the problem on which subjects seored highest on pro-white 
bias. The second problem in the box turns out to be the 
problem on which subjects scored the lowest (white superior, 
clean-dirty) . It seems as if th~ su~ject reacted to the im-
_plausibility of the first problem by making a strong attempt 
to equalize it. This may have been partially due to not knowing 
that in future problems the whites would have the upper hand 
occasionally. Then when confronted by the second problem where 
whites were superior, he tried to make up for his previous 
bias by biasing the estimates in the other direction. If this 
explanation is correct, then it is plausible to assume that 
without the order effect the Negro superior, smart-dumb mean 
would be lower and the white superior, clean-dirty mean would 
' 
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be higher. If these adjustments are made, pro-white bias 
scores would then tend to be higher on the clean-dirty 
problems than on either of the other two. Some support for this 
interpretation is found in the high white-overpopulatibn bias 
scores for the white superior, clean-dirty problem which suggests 
I 
that subjects may have been reluctant to underestimate the high 
white-clean category. Of the three trait areas, only the 
clean-dirty dimension is highly loaded on the evaluative factor 
of the semantic differential and thus the hypothesis that 
there is at least some pro-white bias across all ~ubjects 
receives further indirect suppart. 
That pro-white bias is less for the hardworking-lazy 
problems(as suggested by the main effects of trait content 
on pro-white bias) receives further support from the signifi-
cant P x C interactions on positive-trait bias and white-
overpopulation bias. The high scores on the white superior, 
hardworking-lazy problem for both measures can be interpreted 
as meaning that when confronted with inescapable evidence 
of the superiority of whites, the s~bject react by raising both 
the Negro hardworking. category and the white lazy category thus 
equalizing the two races somewhat on the trait. 
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Structural Analysis 
In looking at the four percentage estimates, it is helpful 
to think of them in terms of the problem confronting the 
subject. Because the four estimates had to sum to 100%, if 
the subject makes an error on one estimate, he is immediately 
/ 
faced with the problem of correcting it by making one or more 
errors in the opposite direction. The. dilemma is confounded 
' if what he thinks he sees is not what he thinks should be there. 
For example, if in the Negro superior problem a subject lowers 
the Negro positive and white negative percentage~ to come more 
in line with his pre-experimental opinion, it may be difficult 
for him to raise either the white positive or the Negro negative 
estimates if he remembers that they were both quite low. 
The covariance matrix in Table 3 gives some information on how 
subjects went about solving this problem. The structural analy-
sis confirmed the correctness of the equipredictability co-
variance pattern. The following relations among the elements 
in the covariance matrix can therefore be assumed: 1) covariance 
between white positive and white negative = covariance between 
Negro positive and Negro negative = variance due to the trait 
component, 21 covariance between white positive and Negro 
positive = covariance between white negative and Negro negative = 
variance due to the race~ component, 3) covariance between 
white positive and Negro negative covariance between white 
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negative and Negro positive = variance due to the general ahility 
level component which in this case is equal to zero (since all 
estimates had to sum to 100%). Inspection of ~x indicates 
that variance due to the trait component is relatively large 
compared to variance due to the race component. 
I 
The pattern 
of the covariances suggests that if a subject makes an error 
on a category estimate, he will most probably correct it by 
making an opposite error on the same race - different trait 
category. There is a s_omewhat lesser tendency to correct the 
error by making an opposite error 6n the differe~t race - same 
trait category. 
The tendency to correct an estimate error within the same 
race is logical in the sense that if a subject thinks a race is 
high on a trait, he would probably think it was low on the 
o"ppos i te trait. The tendency to correct an estimate error 
within the same trait designation indicates that if a subject 
sees one race as high on a trait, he tends to see the other 
race as lower on it and vice versa. This latter tendency can 
be explained as a tendency to exaggerate differences between 
the races. It is important to note here that the estimates can 
be described in terms of the effects of the race factor (Negro 
and white) and the trait factor (positive and negative) because 
of the conformity of the; obtained covariance matrix to the 
45 
model specified by the equipredictability covariance pattern. 
It is not a necessary condition of the design. 
It is interesting to note that if all estimates were 
.either extremely pro-white biased or extremely pro-Negro 
biased, one would expect high covariances in the following 
I 
directions: 
. 
White Positive 
White Negative 
Negro Positive 
Negro Negative 
White 
Positive 
1 
White 
Negative 
1 
Negro 
Positive 
+ 
1 
Negro 
Negative 
+ 
1 
Such an overall covariance matri~ would not be expected in part 
because of the large number of middle attitude subjects. Al-
though the covariance matrices are helpful in determining 
relationships they are of no use in determining the direction 
of specific errors actually made. The transformation of the 
scores into the three contrast variables, therefore, had the 
asset of not only preserving the relationships between the 
category errors but of also indicating the direction of error. 
Attitude Distribution 
A significant numbeF of whites rated Negroes more favorably 
than they did whites. This is interesting in view of the fact 
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that almost without exception others have found (for whites at 
least) own race preference greater than other race preference 
(Morland, 1962; Landreth and Johnson, 1953; Stevenson and 
.Stewart, 1958; Gilbert, 1951; Horowitz, 1936; Katz and Braly, 
1933). Findings that people tend to regall more favorable 
items about their own group than about other groups lends 
support to this belief (Alper and Korchin, 1952; Taft, 1954; 
Kanungo and Das, 1960). Bettleheim and Janowitz (1964) in 
reviewing the literature, however, noted a decline over the 
t 
previous two decades in derogatory stereotyping of Negroes. 
Karl ins, et al. (1969) confirmed this tendency and also noted 
an increasing tendency for American whites to categorize 
themselves in decidedly less flattering terms. However, 
neither of the latter two studies found white evaluation 
falling below Negro evaluation. It should be noted here of 
course that in this study the majority of subjects did express 
a higher preference for own race over other. A finding that 
approximately 20% of the subjects in a predominately white, 
middle class, Catholic University evaluate Negroes higher than 
members of their own white race, however, does suggest that 
in future research own race· preferenc~ should not be assumed to 
hold across the board. Adding in the subjects who evaluated 
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both races equally (11) we find that close to one third of the 
subjects did not evaluate their own group as superior. Hope-
fully this trend in attitude change is real. If so, it is 
probably a result of the increasing attention given to the 
black man, the many stories, in depth studies, etc. in the 
/ 
mass media. The "Black is beautiful'' movement and perhaps 
increasing guilt among many whites for the white racism in 
America are likely other factors. The fact that the semantic 
differential followed immediately after the percentage 
estimation problems suggests the possibility tha4 some subjects 
may have heen through the cover sto~y at this point and 
·lowered their scores in order to appear more acceptable to the 
experimenter. A related possibility is that the nature of the 
. 
last three problems ( Negro superior, White superior, racial 
.equality) had an effect on attitude in the direction of a more 
pro-Negro attitude. To eliminate these last two effects, the 
best design would be to separate the attitude measures and 
problems. Since racial attitudes are apparently rather stable 
over time, there is no reason why in the future the attitude 
measures could not be given weeks or months before or after 
the actual experiment. 
' 
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~ummary 
In summary it can be said that there does not seem to be 
a significant relationship between a subject's relative racial 
attitude as measured by the semantic differential and percentage 
estimation of positive and negative tra~ts with a Negro and 
white population. The direction of means over the three 
attitude levels, however, was in the predicted direction and 
suggests that the lack of relationship may have be~n due to an 
inadequate measure of attitude. It is possible that a measure 
based on a "failure in rationality" would be mar~ appropriate. 
Further research is needed to test ihis hypothesis. 
Resu~ts indicate a tendency across all subjects to bias 
the estimates in favor of whites. This tendency seems to be 
most pronounced in the Negro superior problems and in problems 
~here the trait content is clean-dirty. There is also some 
support for inferring that whites are reluctant to view 
Negroes as lazy. These findings suggest that a subject would 
be more prone to infer a correlation between race and trait 
when the relationship is favorable to whites. The tendency to 
equalize distributions, however, seems to indicate that subjects 
would be reluctant to infer any stro~g correlation between race 
and trait. A significant effect of attitude on estimation of 
positive-trait persons ~rrespective of race suggests that pro-
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Negro subjects would be less likely to infer a difference 
between the two races than pro-white subjects. 
/ 
so 
Appendix A 
Order of Problems 
Problem Number Problem· Distribution (P) Trait Content ( c) 
/ 
1. Negro Superior Smart - Dumb 
2 I White superior Clean - Dirty 
3. White Superior Hardworking - Lazy 
4 . Racial Equality Clean - Dirty 
Smart 
-
Dumb 
t 
Racial Equality 5' 
6. White Super io;r Smart - Dumb 
7. Negro Superior Hardworking - Lazy 
8, Negro Superior Clean - Dirty 
9 ... Racial Equ'ality Hardworking - Lazy 
Note: All subjects get the same order of problems. 
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Appendix B 
Exact Wording on Instruction Cards 
(including cover stories) 
and 
Percentage Estimation/Cards 
1. General Instruction Card 
Most people could work a percentage problem on paper. But 
in daily life the impression a person has of a particular group 
usually determines his estimation of the percenta~e of people 
in that group having a particular trait. This is a test to 
see how well people estimate precentages on the basis of first 
impressions. How well you do has nothing to do with your 
intelligence or mathematical ability. Because most recent 
group research has considered race differences and similarities, 
the problems have been drawn from this area. 
There are nine problems and for each problem there is one 
deck of c~rds. To work the first problem, pick up the first 
deck of cards, marked ''Problem l." Read and follow the 
instructions on the first card. in the deck. After working the 
problem return the deck to its proper place in the box and pick 
up the card deck for the next problem. Instructions for each 
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problem will be on the first card of each deck. After you have 
worked all nine problems, pick up the next deck of cards. 
Further instructions will be on the first card of that deck. 
RETURN THIS CARD TO THE BOX - PICK UP PROBLEM 1 DECK 
/ 
2. Instruction Card for Problem 1 
The International Institute of Scientific Research did 
a study to determine whether or not there are any real differ-
ences between American Negroes and White people. They took a 
large sample of Negro people and a large sample of White people. 
They then measured each person ~n the Negro group and each 
person in the White group for intelligence. If the person's 
IQ was above a certain level they called that person Smart and 
. 
if the person's IQ was below a certain level they called that 
person Dumb. This set of cards represents a cross section of 
the people used in the study. There is one card for each 
person. Each card tells the person's race, White or Negro, 
and his intelligence, Smart or Dumb. Look at each card in this 
set once and then put it on the bottom of the deck. When you 
have looked at all the cards you are to answer the questions on 
the last card. After answering the questions put the deck back 
in the box and pick up the deck of cards for Problem 2. 
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Remember that this is a test of first impressions; do not 
try to count the cards. Go through the cards at a steady pace 
and try to form a general impression. 
3. Percentage Estimation Card for Problem 1 
Answer the following four questioni on the basis of your 
first impressions. Do not spend a lot of time thinking about 
the answer; just put down your first impression: Remember that 
the four percentages should add up to 100%. 
What percentage of Negroes are Dumb? 
What percentage of Whites fore D?mb? 
What percentage of Negroes are Smart? 
What percentage of Whites are Smart? 
Total 100% 
RETURN DECK TO BOX UNDER PROBLEM 1 PICK UP DECK FOR PROBLEM 2 
4. Instruction Card for Problem 2 
Recently there has been quite a controversy concerning 
whether White people or Negro people keep their houses up better. 
The Metropolitan Commission on Urban Affairs undertook a study 
.of the problem. A team of both Negro and White real estate 
agents rated a large number of Negro ~omes and a large number 
of White homes. If a home received above a certain score it 
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was called Clean and if a home received below a certain score 
it was called Dirty. This set of cards represents a cross-
section of the homes rated in this study. There is one card 
for each home. Each card tells the homeowner's race, White or 
Negro, and his home up-keep rating, Clean or Dirty. 
I 
Look at 
each card in this set once and then put it on the bottom of the 
deck. When you have looked at all the cards you are to answer 
the questions on the last card. After answering the questions 
put the deck back in the box and pick up the deck of cards for 
Problem 3. 
Remember that this is a test o~ first impressions; do not 
try to count the cards. Go through the cards at a steady pace 
and try to form a general impression. 
5. Percentage Estimation Card for Problem 2 
Answer the following four questions on the basis of your 
first impression. Do not spend a lot of time thinking about 
the answer; just put 
the four percentages 
What percentage 
What percentage 
What percentage 
What percentage 
down your first impression. 
should add up to 100%. 
of Negro 
of White 
of Negro 
of White 
Total 
~ 
homes are Clean? 
homes are Clean? 
homes are Dirty? 
homes are Dirty? 
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Remember that 
100% 
RETURN DECK TO BOX UNDER PROBLEM 1 PICK UP DECK FOR PROBLEM 3 
6. Instruction Card for Problem 3 
After- passage of the Equal Opportunity Act, the National 
·Association of Consultants to Employers co~ducted a survey on 
the work habits of American White men arrd American Negro men. 
A large group of workers were s~udied and each worker was rated 
on both efficiency at work and number of hours worked per week. 
If the two ratings added together were above a cer~ain score 
the worker was called Hardworking and if the two scores added 
together were below a certain score the worker was called Lazy. 
There is one card for each man. Each card tells the worker's 
race, White or Negro, and his work rating, Hardworking or Lazy. 
Look at_ each card in this set once and then put it on the bottom 
of the deck. When ·you have looked at all the cards you are to 
answer the questions on the last card. After answering the 
questions put the deck back in the box and pick up the deck of 
cards for Problem 4. 
Remember that this is a test of first impressions; do not 
try to count the cards. Go through the cards at a steady pace 
·and try ~o form a gen~ral impression. 
7. Percentage Estimation Card for Problem 3 
Answer the followin~ four questions on the basis of your 
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first impression. Do not spend a lot of time thinking about 
the answer; just put down your first impression. 
the four percentages should add up to 100%. 
What percentage of Whites are. Lazy? 
What percentage of Negroes are Lazy? 
/ 
What percentage of Whites are Hardworking? 
What percentage of Negroes are Hardworking? 
Total 
Remember that 
100% 
RETURN DECK TO BOX UNDER PROBLEM 3 PICK UP DECK FOR PROBLEM 4 
8. Instruction Card for Problem 4 
The cards in this deck represent a different cross-sectional 
group of homeowners rated by the Metropolitan Commission on 
Urban Affairs. There is one card· for· each home. Each card 
tells the homeowner's race, White or Negro, and his home up-keep 
rating, CJ.ean or Dirty. Look at each card in this set once and 
then put it on the bottom of the deck. When you have looked at 
all the cards you are to answer the questions on the last card. 
After answering the questions put the deck back in the box and 
pick up the deck of cards for Problem 5. 
Remember that this is a test of first impressions; do not 
try to count the cards. Go through the cards at a steady pace 
and try to form .a general impression. 
' 
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9. Percentage Estimation Card for Problem 4 
(Same as for Problem 2 with questions in different random 
order.) 
10. Instruction Card for Problem 5 
The cards in this deck represent a piff erent cross-sectional 
group of persons tested for IQ by the International Institute 
of Scientific Research. There is one card for each person. 
Each card tells the person's race, White or Negro, ~nd his 
intelligence, Smart or Dumb. Look at each card in this set once 
and then put it on the bottom of the deck. 
I 
When you have looked 
at all the cards you are to answer the questions on the last 
card. After answering the questions, put the deck back in the 
box and pick up the deck of cards for Problem 6. 
11. Percentage Estimation Card for Problem 5 
(Same as for Problem 1 with questions in different random 
order.) 
12. Instruction Card for Problem 6 
(Same as Instruction Card for Problem 5) . 
13. Percentage Estimation Card for Problem 6 
(Same as for Problem 1 with questions in different random 
order.) 
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14, Instruction Card for Problem 7 
The cards in this deck represent a different cross-sectional 
group of workers rated by the National Association of Consultants 
.to Employers. There is one card for each worker. Each card 
tells the worker's race, White or Negro, and his work rating, 
/ 
Hardworking or Lazy. Look at each card in this set once and 
then put it on the bottom of the deck. When you have looked at 
all the cards you are to answer the questions on the last card. 
After answering the questions, put the deck back in the box and 
pick up the deck of cards for Problem 8. 
Remember that this is a te~t of' first impressions; do not 
try to count the cards. Go through the cards at a steady pace 
and try to form a general impression, 
15. Percentage Estimation Card for Problem 7 
(Same as for Problem 3 with questions in different random 
order.} 
16. Instruction Card for Problem 8 
(Same as Instruction Card for Problem 4.) 
17. Percentage Estimation Card for Problem 8 
(Same as for Problem 2 with questions in different random 
orde~.) 
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18. Instruction Card for Problem 9 
(Same as Instruction Card for Problem 7.) 
19. Percentage Estimation Ca~d for Problem 9 
(Same as for Problem 3 with questions in different random 
order.) 
/ 
20. Semantic Differential Instruction Card 
The purpose of this test is to measure the first impression 
various people have of different groups. The following cards 
are designed to allow you to give your first im~ression by 
t 
rating different groups on a series of descriptive scales. On 
each card you will find a different group listed at the top and 
beneath it a set of scales. Here is how to use the scales: 
Place ~n "X" in the appropriate s~ace on each of the seven-point 
scales. For example if you feel that the group is VERY ·GOOD, 
you might place your "X" 
bad: . 
--- ---
. . 
. . 
--- --- ---
___ : __ X_: good 
neutral 
If you feel that the group is VERY BAD, you might place your ''X" 
bad: X . 
--- ---
. . 
. . 
--n-eutral __ _ 
___ . ___ :good 
Or you might feel that the group should be somewhere in between 
in which case you should mark your "X;, in one of the middle 
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spaces. It is important that you CHECK ONLY IN THE SPACES, 
that you CHECK EVERY SCALE FOR EVERY GROUP and that you put 
only ONE CHECK ON A SINGLE SCALE, Work fairly quickly, Do not 
worry or puzzle over individual items. Do not look back through 
the cards. Check only your FIRST IMPRESSIONS. 
t 
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